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TANABE HAJIME AND THE HINT OF A DHARMIC FINALITY
James W. HEISIG
Abstract:
The Japanese philosopher, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) is taken up as an example 
of a thinker who, straddles intellectual histories East and West. Of all the Kyoto School 
philosophers, it was he who took history most seriously. He not only criticized Kan-
tian, Hegelian, and Marxist notions of teleology and the modern scientific myth of 
«progress» on their own ground, but went on to counter these views of history with a 
logic of emptiness grounded in Buddhist philosophy. The essay concludes with an at-
tempt to uncover the tacit assumption that allows Tanabe to make his arguments. It 
was originally delivered as a keynote address to a conference at the University of Leiden 
on the theme «Is there a Dharma of History?».
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To inquire into the «Dharma of history» is to face two distinct but interlacing ques-
tions. On the one hand, we want to know how the notion of Dharma can be applied 
to the unfolding of history writ large. Insofar as Dharma refers not only to an eternally 
valid norm for the behavior of individuals and societies in the historical world but also 
to the most fundamental principle governing the flow of human experience, and by 
extension the life story of all things that sense the world around them, it can hardly fail 
to take into account all forms of unity and disunity, continuity and discontinuity that 
are to be found in reality, both in their contemporary immediacy and in their passage 
from the past to the future. The question is not whether Dharma governs history—it 
does so by definition—but how and to what extent. In other words, if Dharma applied 
only to human behavior, it would not be a fundamental principle of history. The first 
question we put to the notion of a «Dharma of history,» then, has to do with seeing 
what history looks like when viewed through the Dharmic lens, as opposed to the va-
riety of lenses that philosophies East and West have employed to describe the passage 
of reality through time. In this sense, it is a basically an archaeological question about 
the collective imagination of civilizations that used the notion of Dharma. For the 
answer to be true, it need only provide sufficient textual evidence and phenomeno-
logical data.
If this first question is basically descriptive, a second and more concrete question 
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asks how a Dharmic view of the unfolding of history affects the way one relates to the 
world. Laying out the evolution of the idea of Dharma over its two and a half millennia 
of recorded history is one thing. Asking whether, by and large, it has been and still is a 
reliable way of guiding history to change for the better is another. But there is no 
Archimedean ground from which to put such a question. We cannot abstract from 
history to talk about history, wrenching the idea of Dharma from the environment that 
produced and sustained it, and then appraise its moral utility. Inquiry into the «truth» 
of the idea, it seems to me, can only begin at the borderlands of philosophy East and 
West.
A Dharmic View of History as Purposeless
I should like to look at a Dharmic view of history cast in the language of Western 
philosophy from a perspective informed by Buddhist thinking, namely, that developed 
by the twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime. I choose Tanabe be-
cause he exemplifies the philosophical shift from the covertly Christian preoccupation 
with purposive history to a Buddhist rephrasing of the question.
Tanabe’s first venture into the philosophy of history, as is often the case with young 
scholars, was not prompted by a particular problem he was wrestling with at the time 
but by a request from his teacher, Nishida Kitar, to compose a memorial lecture in 
honor of the two-hundredth anniversary of Kant’s birth. Tanabe was not very happy 
about the imposition. It was 1924 and he was just returning from an extended stay 
Germany, where he had shaken the neo-Kantian dust off his sandals and all but lost 
interest in Husserl’s phenomenology, the two primary resources from which he had 
hoped to clarify the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences. His 
head was buzzing with ideas he had been discussing with the young Heidegger, which 
only further disposed him to compose a basically critical text. Tanabe’s target was 
Kant’s notion of teleology as laid out in the Critique of Judgment, which he recognized 
as the weakest point in Kant’s philosophy of history and to which he offered, as he 
understood it, a fundamentally Buddhist response.
Kant’s aim was to apply reason to the «idiotic course of things human» in order to 
provide a consoling view of the distant future and to demonstrate «how the human 
race finally achieves the condition in which all the seeds implanted in it by nature can 
fully develop and in which the destiny of the human race can be fulfilled here on 
earth.»1 Whatever purpose there is to history, Kant recognized, will not be a function 
1 Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by V. L. Dowdell and H. Rud-
nick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 11-12, 24-5. On the place of this work in Kant’s thought, 
see the helpful essay by Leon Pompa, «Philosophical History in Kant and Hegel,» in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel’s 
Critique of Kant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 185-94.
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of the forethought of individuals but will have to function often in spite of our efforts. 
In his terms, since no empirical investigation of history is likely to provide evidence of 
a progressive evolution, we need to look for an a priori «clue» of the «guiding thread» 
that drives individuals and nations towards their natural purpose. Our telos may be 
natural to us, but we can only guess at what it might be, or rather must guess if we are 
to reason about the «idiotic course» of human history at all.
As we see in the third Critique, for Kant any principle of purposive causality in his-
tory would have to be regulative, not constitutive. This means that it can do no more 
than encourage us think as if there were a purpose when we examine the causes that 
actually constitute history; teleological thinking cannot yield a metaphysic of the em-
pirical world, but it can serve as a heuristic tool for suggesting ways to unify the meta-
physics of nature and morality. On this point Kant is clear: simply because we do not 
have the means to verify the hypothesis of a purposive causality is not sufficient reason 
to forfeit it altogether; if it were, it would drag all of reason with it into the abyss of 
meaninglessness. In a sense, Kant’s problem with locating the telos of history relates to 
his conception of the human being as both phenomenon and noumenon—knowable 
in part by the senses as a datum given in space and time; and in part knowable only by 
reason as something that resides outside of space and time. To this latter, noumenal 
dimension of the human belongs the capacity for self-motivated, autonomous, free 
will, which seems to preclude any predications or expectations about how it will be 
exercised. In short, if there is such a thing as a «natural destiny» in human nature to-
wards a better, more moral society, it would have to show up in actual, observable 
historical phenomena; but human free will, of which there is phenomenal evidence, 
would be compromised by anything that would incline it towards one end or another. 
Neither the noumenon of a blind causation bending our wills to its own, nor the phe-
nomenon of the cumulative exercise of free will can justify an a priori argument for a 
telos to history. For all his insistence on «seeds of enlightenment» coming to flower and 
bearing fruit that can be «passed on from one generation to the next» as the human 
race moves towards «nature’s purpose,» in the end Kant had no way out of the hobble 
in which his critique of reason has landed him.
This is where Tanabe steps in with his proposal of a third teleology that belongs 
neither to nature nor to free will but stands opposed to both—a «teleology of self-
awareness.» He defines it in his all too familiarly snarled style:
The teleology of self-awareness begins with a shift from the formal teleology of seeing all 
things from the standpoint of the ego to the internal teleology of seeing all things as ends 
in themselves, and then returns to viewing the ego in its concrete stance of seeing all 
things as ends in themselves, to recognize that this corresponds to the purpose of the ego, 
which can thus for the first time become an end in itself. The sense in which we can speak 
of an awareness of a finality for the self wherein the will stands outside of and independent 
of the self, is what I call a teleology of self-awareness.... As a union of enlightenment and 
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rationality... the cognitive will at the ground of reflective judgment negates the self and 
then returns to the self to rediscover it under the guidance of concrete moral will.... Of 
necessity morality includes a religious posture. The teleology of self-awareness and 
morality can be said to correspond to the static reflection and the dynamic productivity 
of one and the same concrete standpoint of will.2
To appreciate what Tanabe is trying to do, we need to leave aside the obvious reso-
nances with Nishida’s thinking at the time, and thus, indirectly, with Schopenhauer’s 
and Bergson’s ideas of «will» and «desire.» We need also to resist the temptation to trace 
the still brewing influence of Heidegger. We have also to allow him his own reading of 
what are very complex and far from univocal Buddhist terms.
Tanabe’s strategy begins as a simple ascent from the opposition at one level of ab-
straction to the resolution of the opposition at a higher level, culminating in an idea of 
a «will» in which all things in the world, including the thinking, perceiving individual 
participate without owning or controlling it. To account for the wide varieties of «pur-
pose,» Kant had introduced two pairs of distinctions between teleological judgments: 
they are material if they refer to existing things, otherwise they are formal; and they are 
subjective if they refer to the feelings or desires of the individual making the judgment, 
otherwise objective. Tanabe’s «dialectics of will,» as he calls it, does not stop at a purely 
logical exercise of synthesizing Kant’s opposites. It raises the question of how to recon-
cile the negating of the self in religious enlightenment (悟性) with the recovery of the 
self in rational understanding (理性). Having already acknowledged the pivotal role of 
morality and religion in culture,3 Tanabe agrees with Kant’s position that any talk of 
the purposive exercise of freedom requires that we bring history into the picture, and 
that this includes not only the free will of individual persons but also the will of the 
natural order. The problem, Tanabe insists, is that Kant’s critical philosophy remains 
stuck in a subjectivistic view of history that reduces the will of nature to the hidden 
background of the phenomenal world. He therefore proposes a corrective to Kant: «In 
the same sense in which freedom is a constitutive principle of morality, the teleology of 
self-awareness is the constitutive principle of history.»4
By Tanabe’s own admission, he was too trapped in the formal logic of the neo-
Kantians at the time to carry the intuition any further. It was only in his subsequent 
turn to Hegel and the logic of dialectics that this larger picture came to the fore.5 Hegel 
confirmed his suspicion that the telos of history can be viewed as an active, constitutive, 
intelligible phenomenon and not merely as a regulative, guiding assumption. Hegel 
2 『田辺元全集』[Complete Works of Tanabe Hajime, hereafter thz] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1963-1964), 3: 64-5.
3 文化の概念」[The Notion of Culture], thz 1: 423-47.
4 thz 3: 71.
5 Tanabe himself acknowledges this in a 1948 reprint of the essay (thz 3: 8-9).
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helped him to take the will of the individual moral subject off the pedestal on which 
Kant had place it, and to locate it in a «dialectical» relationship with a will that pre-
cedes the distinction between subject and object, universal and particular. Hegel’s 
problem became Tanabe’s own: Although the work of nature’s will in history can nei-
ther be blind, random happenstance (in which case we would speak of «necessity» 
rather than «will»,) nor direct, causal agency (in which case it would become a kind of 
super-subject whose freedom compromises the freedom of the moral individual), its 
pursuit of a telos must allow for something of both.
Hegel’s solution was to see the finality of history as the self-unfolding of absolute 
spirit towards full consciousness of its own freedom. Insofar as individuals become 
conscious of a rhythm in history that transcends their own will, they are free to actual-
ize that process in themselves by recognizing that its aims are at bottom identical with 
their own. Tanabe took this idea, already in germ in the passage cited above, and car-
ried it in a different direction. Unlike Hegel, however, he never made any attempt to 
demonstrate the activity of spirit in history with actual analysis of the concrete means 
by which particular human cultures and histories have advanced towards a higher pur-
pose. Rather, he stopped where his Buddhist roots (or at least, his Buddhist roots as he 
had inherited them from Nishida) disposed him to stop: the goal towards which cul-
ture and history advance, when they are in fact advancing and not declining, is self-
awareness. Put the other way around, the more self-aware individuals are, the more 
they actualize the purpose of the world at large and human societies within it.
At this point we may pause to paraphrase the question, «Is there a Dharma of his-
tory?» in terms suggested by Tanabe’s critique of teleology: If human existence is sub-
ject to a universal Law of necessity that determines the inevitable consequences of free 
action, and if the proper exercise of freedom is identical with the achievement of a state 
of awareness in which the attachment of the individual subject to self-determination is 
seen to be illusory, does history itself, as the arena in which both the attachment to self 
and detachment from the illusions of selfhood are realized, in any sense «will» compli-
ance with that Law? Does the history of the world of becoming and impermanence 
contain within it a purposive dynamic purposive, conscious submission to which sig-
nals the culmination of human existence?
Granted, Tanabe, like Nishida before him, had already disassociated the notion of 
«will» from its exclusive connection with the individual willing self to include the 
broader meaning of a purposive orientation, drive, dynamic, or even «desire» within 
reality itself, there is no hint of a transcendent, provident divinity bending history to 
its own ends. If anything, the entire question as just paraphrased is mooted by Tanabe’s 
eventual elimination of the notions of will and telos altogether from the idea of history 
while maintaining a sense of intelligibility or lawfulness. In other words, what is inter-
esting about Tanabe’s Dharmic view of history is precisely that he turned his back on 
the Christian assumptions that influenced Kant and Hegel in posing the question of 
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historical teleology, orienting his thinking towards a more explicitly Buddhist posture. 
Rather than answer the question his study of Western philosophers had faced him 
with, he changed the question.
I will not attempt here to rehearse the whole length and breadth of Tanabe’s writings 
to catalog his remarks on purposiveness in history, but as a terminus ad quem we may 
note his insistence in his 1948 work, The Dialectics of Christianity, that freedom needs 
the unfreedom of necessity, the freedom for evil, and the «freedom to negate freedom 
in order to be completely self-aware»; or again, that reason is «arrogant and self-decep-
tive» insofar as it «clings to the standpoint of being and pursues human liberation 
through the teleological integration of reason itself.» On the face of it, this sounds like 
a fall into skepticism, or at least a retreat from philosophy into a sort of mysticism.6 In 
fact, it is altogether consistent with that pursuit of «the union of enlightenment and 
rationality» that had led him earlier to propose a teleology of self-awareness. The criti-
cal turn, at least philosophically, hinges on his break with the Hegel’s absolute of being:
The rational character of Hegel’s philosophy turned the God of his «absolute spirit» into 
a rational, systematic unity and turned the whole of the course of history into something 
that unified it from within. This comprehensive and universalizing quality lured him 
towards seeing God as absolute being rather than as absolute nothingness, as a self-
sufficient and perfect totality embracing all relative beings in an unmediated fashion. 
Because philosophy reached its zenith in this absolute notion of God, the whole of the 
history of philosophy became a thing of the past. The unmediated world-integrating 
system that aimed at unifying existence could not avoid, simultaneously and as if by 
dialectical necessity, collapsing into its opposite—self-alienation.7
The passage is telling on several counts. First, it rejects the idea of history as a single, 
organic whole driven by a higher rationality. Second, it sees the association of God 
with being as entailing the contradiction of exempting one being from the dialectic of 
mutually mediating interdependency, which Tanabe insisted is characteristic of all be-
ings. Third, it accuses Hegel’s notion of the absolute of rendering the history of phi-
losophy—West as well as East—into no more than stepping stones to a higher mode 
of thought. And finally, the irony of Hegel’s system of integration of the individual self 
into a greater whole is that it was bound to disintegrate into a contraction of the self-
awareness it had set out to expand. The alternative, as this passage only hints at but as 
Tanabe’s work makes explicit again and again, is to see the absolute not as a being po-
6 Though accused of mysticism, Tanabe argued consistently that it in only one aspect of religion. It is on this basis 
that he rejects the view that Schleiermacher’s Universumsgefühl is in any sense «Eastern,» arguing that it is more 
a fruit of Kant’s teleology. In this connection, he explicitly concurs with Karl Barth’s critique of Schleiermacher as 
tending to pure mysticism or aestheticism (thz 11: 561).
7 thz 10: 282, 290, 321.
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sitioned outside of the world, untouched by the world and directing it providentially 
to its own ends, but as an absolute nothingness that can only become manifest in the 
actual workings of history.
Of course, Tanabe realized that the idea of an absolute spirit coming to self-con-
sciousness in history, or its underlying paradigm of a provident deity willing towards 
salvation in accord with its own plan, are not the only models of teleology. Marx had 
made the leap from the «kingdom of necessity» to the «kingdom of freedom» by defin-
ing true freedom as the alignment and expansion of personal will through the accept-
ance of the necessities of social progress. At the level of formal logic, however, Marx 
had failed to bring into the dialectic the full impact of the freedom for evil.8 This was 
the very point at which Kant felt impelled to introduce religion into the picture, and 
with it the basically Christian model of salvation history. Marx did not. On the con-
trary he recognized that the only real finality in history would have to function as a 
constitutive principle.9 Kant’s capitulation to the regulative principle, a sort of guiding 
fiction for those in search of patterns to the story of human progress and decline, Ta-
nabe argued, failed not because he acknowledged that reason had reached its limits in 
trying to reconcile necessity with free will, but because he clung to reason by diluting 
the demands that reason makes on us and yielding too soon to Christian theology.
This is not the point to assess Tanabe’s reading of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The im-
portant point is that each of them represented to him something crucial to the «present 
task of philosophy, the mutual definition of the historical relative and the eternally 
absolute,» a task that requires the «mutual mediation of Christianity, Marxism, and 
Japanese Buddhism.»10 The shift to God as absolute nothingness, as useful as it is for 
adjusting the idea of God to a more Eastern absolute, had still to take into account the 
concrete engagement in history and human society that Christianity, in both its theo-
logical and philosophical forms,11 as well as Marxism, represent. In this sense, rather 
than liberate history from the Western preoccupation with finality, the introduction of 
the Eastern, Buddhist notion of nothingness is meant to transform it by relocating his-
tory in a new perspective.
Tanabe states his position clearly in the third volume of his Introduction to Philoso-
phy. The distinguishing mark of the Buddhist approach to history lies in its logic of 
8 I assume that Tanabe considered the same argument to apply to the teleologies expressed in various forms of 
social Darwinism, though I cannot put my finger on passages where he makes the point with specific textual ref-
erences.
9 thz 10: 285-7. It is interesting to note how closely Nishitani’s posing of the problem of «fundamental evil» in Reli-
gion and Nothingness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) follows Tanabe’s statement of the problem.
10 thz 10: 269. By Christianity he means to include both Catholic and Protestant insights, and by Japanese Bud dhism 
he seeks an amalgam of Pure Land and Zen.
11 Tanabe is clear on the point that the collapse of religion into «existential philosophy» overlooks the «inseparable 
relationship of theology to religion.» thz 10: 255.
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«emptiness» or «absolute nothingness» (the «absolute» serving to forestall the impres-
sion that «nothingness» is to be understood as a mere negation of «being»). The ap-
proach to history of science and common sense, and dominant in the philosophy of 
history, particularly in Hegelian and Marxist dialectical views, «thinks of history as 
possessing a kind of destination that orients its development. Its goal is not necessarily 
one we arrive at with our arms folded... but something we are engaged in making.» He 
calls it a kind of «becoming-in-action» [成即行] wherein our historical praxis is at the 
same time the goal of historical becoming. It thinks of history in terms of being and 
its goal in terms of «existence,» but actually its goal is emptiness, «From the standpoint 
of emptiness, the destination is a temporal convention [仮] based on a temporal con-
vention.» This is the basis of Tanabe’s regard for Ranke’s relativistic view of history 
with its critique of the Hegelian and Marxist rationalist impositions of «progress» and 
«advance» on history which, in effect, are no more than history viewed from the per-
spective of history.12 Any goal affixed to history from the standpoint of being, Tanabe 
goes on, is given the lie by the complex meanderings and radical relativity of actual 
history:
The very idea of viewing history as necessarily progressing down a path fixed on a goal in 
effect goes against the spirit of dialectics and is therefore is unacceptable to a standpoint 
of emptiness. On the standpoint of emptiness everything is interdependent and relative  
[相依相待]. The positing of an unmovable foundation of the sort that grounds everything 
else in itself as an autonomous, independent principle in the full sense that it is basic, 
ultimate, and completely without reliance on anything else, is disallowed on a standpoint 
of emptiness. Even if one conceives of a clearly defined destination as a relative halfway 
mark, the very fact that it is a fixed goal is enough to disqualify such a view as a radical 
relativism.
Put in terms of the logic of a dialectics, any affirmation not mediated by a negation 
is a vestige of the domain of being. «Clearing away this residue of being can only be 
accomplished by a radical relativism like that of the standpoint of emptiness.»13
That said, the grounding of history on emptiness runs the risk of falling into a pas-
sive resignation that eclipses the need to risk life and limb in historical praxis:
History may be a nothingness, a temporal, convention brought into being on a ground of 
emptiness, but there is no denying the fact that such a way of thinking is in danger of 
sapping history of its gravity history and not taking politics and above all, morality, as a 
serious part of the regulative activity of historical praxis. The problem is... how to link a 
Buddhist approach of emptiness that thinks in terms of the mediation of absolute 
12 Tanabe discusses Ranke’s argument in some details in thz 11: 221-36.
13 Here again, Tanabe gives Nishitani one of his most central terms.
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nothingness with the moral seriousness that is normative in the formal praxis of history 
within the realm of being. This is the central issue for the philosophy of religion and the 
heart of the religious charge of our times.
The structure of Tanabe’s dialectic is not an abstract play of ideas but the pursuit of 
«concrete truth in human life» by «appropriating through religious experience» the op-
posing demands that are made on us: on the one hand, a moral seriousness towards 
acting in the historical world; on the other, «a liberating concentration that transcends 
this empty, provisional world of ours.» The tougher the opposition is perceived to be, 
Tanabe says, the more likely we are to awaken to the unity of those two demands as the 
only path that is open to us.
If even Tanabe’s straining toward the concrete ends up sounding abstract, and in-
deed it is, Tanabe’s ideas of history, as critical as they were of those who ignored con-
crete praxis, were only tested once in the concrete and that was during his brief flirta-
tion with the intellectual foundations of the war effort. Once burned, he shied away 
from actual concrete in the attempt to salvage the formal logic of his view of history.14 
Here, again, in somewhat tortured prose, he reiterates the challenge to engage with 
history as our «common affliction»:
Difficult though it be, in order to awaken to and appropriate not only the necessity and 
moral ought of the practical reality of history but also the opportunity that it invariably 
holds, it seems to me that we require the Buddhist standpoint of an empty, absolute 
nothingness, a standpoint that can plead the cause of a Hegelian or Marxist dialectic and 
yet shake free of the determinative shackles of being that accompany an inflexible aim or 
destination of history along with the necessity of the process such a goal regulates, a 
standpoint of being determined without being determined, of transforming the necessity 
of each moment into autonomous freedom through an act of absolute negation.15
In one sense, the logic of mutually defining affirmation and negation seems to distill 
the particularity of any problem it is applied to into a heavy, bland syrup. Insofar as 
Tanabe’s Dharmic view of history is that of an aimless dialectical struggle between 
reason and the negation of reason, necessity and free will, praxis in the here-and-now 
and religious liberation from the world of becoming, the basic question that teleology 
asks has not so much been addressed as swept aside. Not even his adoption of «love» as 
14 I have spelled this out in an essay on «Tanabe’s Logic of the Species and the Spirit of Nationalism,» James Heisig 
and John Maraldo, Rude Awakenings: Zen the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai‘i Press,1994, 255-88; later I argued that Tanabe’s logic of the specific can still be of use as a philosophi-
cal concept in «Tanabe’s Logic of the Specific and the Critique of the Global Village,» The Eastern Buddhist 28/2 
(1995): 194-224. Although the «logic of the specific» is needed to fill out Tanabe’s position, it is peripheral to the 
argument of this paper and has therefore been omitted from the discussion.
15 Quotations and paraphrases taken from thz 11: 477-80.
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the unifying medium of human existence and historical praxis succeeds in recovering 
the question.16
The Hint of a Dharmic Finality in History
Seen in a broader perspective, however, the problem is not simply one of Tanabe’s 
own making but touches on something within the Buddhist worldview itself. His strat-
egy of incorporating the missing ingredient of engagement with actual history for-
mally recognizes the problem but does not respond to it with any concrete normative 
guidance. Filling that lacuna requires a bigger talent than I can bring to the question, 
but there is one step in that direction I would like to suggest, namely that the very way 
the dialectic is set up suggests that in fact history is not pure and simply an aimless af-
fair, either for Tanabe or for the Japanese Buddhist standpoint he intends to align 
himself with.
We recall that Kant had set up a contrast between the ideal progress of history as 
cultivating our innate «seeds of enlightenment» and harvesting them for succeeding 
generations, on the one hand, and the chaotic and idiotic record of what we have made 
of nature’s gift thus far, on the other. Tanabe’s initial response was to suggest that his-
tory’s goal was «self-awareness,» a union of reason and enlightenment in which the 
individual subject appropriates the fact that all things, just as they are, are ends in 
themselves. This set the stage for viewing history, with Hegel, as the advance of self-
hood willing its own self-awareness, the individual subject being free either to partici-
pate in the process or to measure history in terms of its own egoistic desires. When he 
came to see that the logical consequence of such a position was to view the absolute as 
a supreme being with rational designs on the course of history, he abandoned it in fa-
vor of a view of history as the manifestation of an absolute nothingness that, in itself, 
is neither rational nor irrational, but can only be known as a dialectic of the two. In the 
end, he capitulates to Kant’s dilemma and relieves philosophical reason of the obliga-
tion to seek a purpose in history derived from universal principles.17
The consequence of Tanabe’s Dharmic view of history is that we are left with no 
measure to assess the advance or decline of civilizations as they course through time. 
16 The best account I have read of Tanabe’s late work, 伊藤益 Ito¯ Susumu『愛と氏の哲学――田辺 元』[A Phi-
losophy of Love and Death] (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppansha, 2005), argues that Tanabe’s blend of Buddhism and Chri-
stianity as an «absolute nothingness-in-love» posits a kind of «intentionality» towards self-sacrifice implied in awa-
kening to the Buddha nature within the self. Nevertheless, it is hard to extract anything in his argument or in the 
texts he works with approaching a concrete ethical norm for historical praxis.
17 The logical form of this dialectic comes close to Kant’s idea of the teleological judgment peculiar to pure mathe-
matics, that is as a teleological connection between synthetic a priori principles and a priori constructions—a 
connection that Kant called a «purposiveness without purpose» (Critique of Judgment, 364). As far as I have been 
able to determine, however, Tanabe never mixed his affections for mathematical logic with his philosophy of history.
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There may be a certain wisdom in renouncing the question as beyond the reach of 
reason, but the wisdom comes at a price, namely, forfeiting the right to judge the par-
ticular historical movements as morally acceptable or not. His complaint that Buddhist 
thinking tends to leave us as detached bystanders, arms folded as we watch things 
working themselves out for good or for ill, survives his shift to absolute nothingness—
unanswered.
It is altogether too simplistic to accuse Tanabe’s philosophy of withdrawing into the 
rarefied heights of dialectical logic, and then turn elsewhere for an answer. I am per-
suaded there is genius to be rescued from Tanabe’s lifelong struggle to find a place to 
stand and view the world that is both fair to the ideas that lie within the reach of reason 
and fair to the enlightenments that lie beyond the reach of reason. But to do so means 
restoring to grace the question of a purpose to the Dharma of history.
My suggestion is that, his own strictures to the contrary, Tanabe did subscribe to a 
rational teleology throughout, and further, that this teleology is consistent with a view 
of history implied in the Buddhist notion of enlightenment itself. I do not mean to 
recommend a correction to Tanabe’s philosophy or presume to take his thinking to its 
next stage of development, but only to reclaim an assumption without which I am at a 
loss how to make sense of Tanabe’s position. In a word, the goal of history—both in 
the normative sense of providing a measure for assessing the advance or decline of his-
tory, as well as in the constitutive sense of ascertaining an actual orientation to the ac-
cumulation of events—is clarity of insight. The point may seem so obvious as to be 
empty of content, a mere reupholstering of an already abstract notion of history in still 
more abstract language. In any event, it merits a closer look.
The capacity for «enlightenment» that Kant reckoned our very human nature to be 
seeded with from birth was an Erklärung, an illumination of sight, a clear-headed un-
derstanding of the world as it is. Its opposite was resignation to the vision of the world 
we are instructed to believe in, the renunciation of the freedom to know all we can 
know in favor of the «balls and chains» of dogmatic and rational formulae. Clarity of 
thinking is the mark of maturation not only of the individual but of societies, and all 
indications point to «the obstacles to universal enlightenment... gradually becoming 
fewer.18 Kant’s optimism regarding the future of civilization—tempered, admittedly, by 
the more sanguine reflections of his Idea for a Universal History, penned in the same 
year, 1784—is not at issue here, only his conviction that the goal of human history is 
to see clearly.
In Buddhism, the notion of enlightenment finds itself in surroundings very differ-
ent from Kant’s, but the fundamental idea of liberating the mind to achieve the great-
est clarity of insight holds the same the place of honor. Tanabe himself prefers Buddhist 
18 This is spelled out concisely in his well known essay, «What is Enlightenment?».
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expressions like satori, awakening, or self-awareness,19 but he uses them in a way that 
tries to incorporate Western philosophy’s concept of reason as well as his critique of it. 
In the book that reoriented his later thinking, Philosophy as Metanoetics, he argues that 
the task that reason sets itself in trying to make sense of history can only be carried out 
by achieving a self-awareness that breaks free of reason. Given the fact of historical 
contingency, freedom cannot be achieved through the discovery of invariable princi-
ples of the natural order but only by the individual subject «turning this lack of prin-
ciple into principle by taking over the determination (destiny) of contingency as its 
own will, changing it into its own decision... and submitting itself it.... History is the 
trail of footprints made by this freedom.»20
In order to say this, Tanabe has to assume that the pursuit of self-awareness is a nor-
mative goal for the exercise of freedom, and this in turn implies that there is such a 
thing as progress in the life of the individual who exhausts the powers of reason for 
what they can do and renounces them for what they cannot. At the same time, even 
though he rejects a linear view of the advance of history in favor of a circular one that 
turns on the axis of present moment as the manifestation of an absolute nothingness in 
which past and future mediate each other,21 he continues to speak of an «unfolding of 
reality itself» through the «dialectical unity of absolute and relative, ...the basic princi-
ple that shapes history.»22
If we can therefore speak of a constitutive goal at work in the history of the individ-
ual subject as it affirms and negates its relativity and thus achieves the clarity of insight 
it was born to achieve, the idea of a collective telos would require an impulse that tran-
scends individual history and orients historical existence itself towards a community of 
awakened subjects. The emergence of such a community of the awakened would not 
be not merely a contingent fact that either happens or does not happen, depending on 
the degree of freedom with which reason is understood and exercised. It would be a 
principle of self-determination within history itself to which the individual awakens 
and bends its own will.
On the one hand, the idea runs counter to Tanabe‘s rejection of a telos to history:
Unlike nature, history has no structure... within which a self-identical universal can 
regulate all phenomena according to its own laws, or within which all things can be 
19 The simile of light does not figure directly in Buddhist terminology for «enlightenment» (aside from associated 
terms like 照 and 明) any more than it does in Kant’s. To be fair, the imposition of imagery of «enlightenment» on 
Buddhism is matched by the Sino-Japanese translation of Erklärung as 啓蒙主義, introducing a fitting but no less 
forced image of opening up what is covered in darkness.
20 Philosophy as Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of California Press,1986), 66-7.
21 Philosophy as Metanoetics, 96.
22 Philosophy as Metanoetics, lii.
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directed towards the realization of their essential nature; it lacks a telos for things to 
progress from the possible to the real, from the potential to the actual. All these things 
belong to the substratum or substance of being, and the logic that regulates them is the 
logic of identity. It is otherwise with history, which has no permanent and unmediated 
substratum.23
On the other hand, if self-awareness is the natural fulfillment of human existence, 
and not something inflicted on human existence by those individual prepared to defy 
their natural impulses; and, further, if the conscious subject in whom this inclination 
to awakening is manifest came into being in the course of history without the interfer-
ence of a higher will, it is not something that can be explained merely in terms of indi-
viduals exercising freedom in a completely contingent world. The more individuals 
achieve clarity of insight, the more human existence itself becomes what it in fact is. I 
believe this is what attracted Tanabe to the Christian notion of the communion sancto-
rum, an idea he felt it necessary to keep distinct from specific religious structures but 
also to liberate from the realm of pure myth.24 Although not subscribing to the full 
eschatological context of a community of saints, which implies another world than this 
one ruled over by a supreme being, Tanabe is attracted to the ideal of a social order 
whose «present» is oriented to the self-awareness of all its members, and from which 
the preoccupation with self-deliverance is viewed as an impediment and an offense 
against the fullness of life:
To seek existence for oneself alone by destroying all others is to forfeit one’s own existence 
as well. Only by giving life to those who exist as others, by seeking co-existence despite 
the tension of opposition, and by collaborating for the sake of mutual enhancement can 
the self find life in its fullness.25
Either the absolute disassociation of history from nature breaks down, or the idea of 
«life in its fullness» through «mutual enhancement» has to be classified as an illusion. 
Even if we grant, with Tanabe, that specific human communities are not an end in 
themselves but an upa¯ya that mediates the way to liberation from ignorance, this does 
not disqualify all collective social progress from attesting to a real, constitutive telos to 
history.
Let me try to put this another way, in terms applicable both to the Buddhist idea of 
enlightenment and to the way Tanabe applies it to philosophy of history. The notion 
of liberation from illusion cannot stand if everything in the conventional world is illu-
23 Philosophy as Metanoetics, 291.
24 thz 10: 249, 13: 576.
25 Philosophy as Metanoetics, 290-1.
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sion, just as the snuffing out of all desire cannot eliminate suffering if it entails snuffing 
out the concrete desire to be liberated from suffering.26 We cannot speak of a transfor-
mation of perspective without retaining our ability to see. In order to speak of enlight-
enment at all, we must assume a clarity of insight and the native capacity to reach it. 
As long as we speak of a subject, no matter how far we extend the reach of selflessness, 
we cannot dispense with the idea of a conscious, seeing individual. In other words, 
there is one thing in human existence that that does not need rescuing or liberating or 
saving: insight itself. The only alternative is some form or other of nihilism in which 
consciousness itself, and not just particular forms of consciousness, is rejected as a 
worthless daydream.
Insight is at the heart of Dharma, the empty suchness of things, even if the objects 
of insight invariably belong to the concrete so-and-so-ness. This means that all our talk 
of history advancing or declining, of having a goal or being aimless, is always only half 
of the picture, the half that is marked by being and becoming. It provides us with the 
congenial fictions without which consciousness could not function. To claim that the 
picture is complete only when all our engagements with history, rational as well as 
practical, are seen to be grounded in emptiness may change the way we look at the 
things of life, but does not change the fact that throughout it all we are still seeing. For 
this reason, admittedly a very simple one, I find nothing inconsistent with Buddhist 
teaching in general or with Tanabe’s philosophical applications of it, in concluding that 
the choices I make concerning the way I look at the world can, and should, be aimed 
at seeing and thinking as clearly as I possible can; and that in so doing I neither reduce 
myself to a simple constellation of genes and tutelage nor elevate myself to a position 
outside of time and history. I am simply doing a better job of what Dharma—call it 
nature, history, reality, as you will—has equipped me to do. Being only becomes man-
ifest on a ground of emptiness: the truth of the telos of insight can only be found in the 
exercise of insight that integrates reason and enlightenment.
Those familiar with Tanabe’s writings, even if only what exists in translation, will 
recognize how much I have omitted from the picture in order to focus attention on one 
aspect of his thought. Each time I picked up one of his books in search of a faint 
memory of having read something there relevant to the topic of this essay, I found 
myself entangled in a web of idea far more complex than I could handle in the space of 
a short essay. In the end, I settled on a small selection of conclusions, omitting the full 
fabric of his argument.
In a sense I trust is obvious, the «assumption» about the normative and constitutive 
goal of history that I have argued is implied in Tanabe’s philosophy of history, and in 
26 I am in complete agreement with長谷正諮當Hase Sho¯to¯,『欲望の哲学――浄土教世界の思索』[The Philo-
sophy of Desire: Speculations from the Pure Land World] (Tokyo: Ho¯zo¯kan, 2003), when he insists that desire is 
transformed but not eliminated by liberating it from its concrete objects. See, e.g., 215, 293-4.
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the Buddhist ideas he draws on, rests on a middle ground that is more than the simple 
logical conclusion that I have painted it to be. To be sure, the truth of the assumption 
that human existence, in concordance with what is deepest in its nature, desires clarity 
of insight, can only be demonstrated by acting on it. Put the other way around, its 
untruth entails negating the bulk of accumulated wisdom of the Buddhist and philo-
sophical heritage. Leaving the assumption tacit—or what is worse, retreating to a high 
ground of detachment from all assumptions about the relationship between who we 
are and what we ought to become—cripples intellect from stretching itself to its limits 
and is therefore, when all is said and done, unreasonable and unenlightened.
The paleoanthropologist and mystic Teilhard de Chardin recognized the impor-
tance of such a middle ground that straddles the borderlands of science and religion, 
philosophical reflection and common experience. His Foreword to The Phenomenon of 
Man opens with words that echo a refrain as familiar to the Buddhist sutras as they are 
an expression of his own conclusions. I cite them as a final, more elegant answer to the 
question of the Dharma of history:
Seeing. We might say that the whole of life lies in that verb—if not in end, at least in 
essence.... The history of the living world can be summarized as the elaboration of ever 
more perfect eyes within a cosmos in which there is always something more to be seen.... 
To try to see more and better is not a matter of whim or curiosity or self-indulgence. To 
see or to perish is the very condition laid upon everything that makes up the universe.27
James W. HEISIG
Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture
heisig@nanzan-u.ac.jp
[rebut el 25 de maig de 2011; acceptat per a la seva publicació el 3 d’octubre de 2011]
27 Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 31.
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